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They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither safety nor liberty.'
Benjamin Franklin
O cruel, needless misunderstanding! .. . But it was all right,
everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had
won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother. 2
George Orwell
* Professor of Law and Founding Director Stephen L. Snyder Center for Litigation
Skills (2000-2008) University of Baltimore School of Law. Adjunct Professor of Legal
Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Research funding for this work was underwritten by the National Center for Justice
and the Rule of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law, which is supported
by a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs at the
U.S. Department of Justice. The author acknowledges Professor Thomas K. Clancy,
Director of the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law, the faculty, panel
participants, appellate judges and students of the University of Mississippi School of
Law who attended a lecture and discussion of an earlier draft of this paper, and for the
many helpful suggestions that resulted.
I Benjamin Franklin, Reply of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Governor (Nov.
1755), in POWER QUOTES 106 (Daniel B. Baker ed., 1992).
2 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 266 (Plume 1983) (1949).
895
896 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5
INTRODUCTION
Over two centuries have passed since Benjamin Franklin
quipped that we should defend privacy over security if people
wanted either privacy or security.3 Although his axiom did not
become a rule of law in its original form, its principles found voice
in the Fourth 4 and Fifth5 Amendments of the Constitution's Bill of
Rights.6 To a lesser extent, provisions against the quartering of
3 Franklin, supra note 1.
4 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. One Fourth Amendment historian has explained that the:
Amendment provides that if there is to be a search and seizure, it must be a
reasonable one. The only absolute standard that is set is as to the essentials
of a warrant when such is necessary, as it is in most cases. The purpose of the
latter part of the Amendment of course is to safeguard against the general
warrant and it does this in two ways: first, by prescribing the requirement of
probable cause, necessarily peculiar to each case; and second, by making
requisite the description of the particular place to be searched, the persons to
be apprehended, and the objects to be seized. These requirements limit the
scope of each warrant; they take the decision as to what may and what may
not be done out of the hands of the officer who is to execute the warrant, and
place it with the more trustworthy and sober judgment of a judicial officer. It
is for the latter to pass upon the merits of the allegations and, on the basis of
evidence having behind it the responsibility of an oath, to decide whether
there is reasonable justification for this exceptional proceeding in invasion of
the individual's privacy, and thus to determine what particular actions are
justified on the basis of this showing. There is no temptation for the
ministerial officer to exceed the authority which the magistrate decides to
give him, for he not only thereby subjects himself to civil and criminal
liability but gains no advantage over the accused and merely wastes his
effort.
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 120 (1937) (footnote omitted).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 One Supreme Court Justice has said:
[T]he concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful
government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign
purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them
from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them health and
strength to carry on.
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troops in private homes found in the Third Amendment7 also
support the idea that what a government can require you to do, or
who you must have behind the doors of your home, is an area of
grave importance for privacy purposes.8 By our behavior as a
nation, have we indicated a rejection of the liberty Franklin was
writing about in our modern times? In no area has the rapid rise
of technology affected our lives more than in the area of
communication through computers and other devices, like so-
called "smart telephones."9
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
7 "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
8 In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967), the Supreme Court
said:
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern,
not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment reflects critical values. "Indeed, these rights
are so strong that the Constitution prohibits the most minimal transgressions against
them. . . . Personal security, liberty, and private property are not discrete interests;
they unite to define significant attributes of individual freedom in the democracy."
Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576 (1996).
9 So-called smart phone technology has made it possible to perform many
communications functions in a small device when such tools were unimaginable only a
few years ago. The Supreme Court has already demonstrated a willingness to allow
technology, such as tracking devices, to evade constitutional scrutiny. See United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that placing a beeper type location
device, without a warrant, in a barrel of contraband is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment). It is unlikely that the Court desires to get involved in the day-to-day
regulation of emerging technology. Most recently, the Supreme Court clarified its view
on high technology searches in United States v. Jones, where it held that the
government's use of a Global Positioning System on a private vehicle to monitor its
movements constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, therefore requiring a
warrant to be obtained. See 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The Jones case seems curiously in
conflict with the Court's prior holding in Knotts-invalidating the warrantless
search-in that Justice Scalia's opinion pointed out that the "government physically
occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information." Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 949. Harkening back to the colonial days when horse and carriage was the
primary mode of on-road transportation, the Justice reasoned that the intrusion in
Jones was no different than "a constable's concealing himself in the target's coach in
order to track its movements." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3. It remains to be seen
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As long as people have been communicating, there has been a
desire for others to be interested in hearing what they say.10
Sometimes the speaker or writer desires an audience and the
speaker's freedom to communicate desires protection.11 At other
times, people intend to keep their private words private while
others desire to know their thoughts and intentions. This human
desire, the "right to be let alone,"12 has both practical and legal
limitations. Obviously society has its own right to protect its
members from violence and keep the peace by legislating and
whether this opinion signals any movement toward the Supreme Court extending
greater privacy from technology-assisted searches. It only hinted in the opinion that it
"may eventually have to grapple with these 'vexing problems' in some future cases ...
." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. Currently, such conflicting opinions on intrusion technology
when the Supreme Court takes on such cases do not provide ample guidance as
technology advances. In my view these occasional rulings on such searches will do little
to provide more privacy.
10 The most familiar area of electronic intrusion that courts have addressed is
wiretapping. But such surveillance, that is, listening in secret, is an ancient practice.
As one court recently explained:
Eavesdropping is an ancient practice which at common law was condemned
as a nuisance. At one time the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the
eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private
discourse. The awkwardness and undignified manner of this method as well
as its susceptibility to abuse was immediately recognized. Electricity,
however, provided a better vehicle and with the advent of the telegraph
surreptitious interception of messages began. As early as 1862[,] California
found it necessary to prohibit the practice by statute. During the Civil War
General J.E.B. Stuart is reputed to have had his own eavesdropper along
with him in the field whose job it was to intercept military communications of
the opposing forces....
The telephone brought on a new and more modern eavesdropper known
as the 'wiretapper.' Interception was made by a connection with a telephone
line.
Kopko v. Miller, 842 A.2d 1028, 1034 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (quoting Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1967)).
"1 "In time, given the global movement toward democracy, interactive voice, audio,
video data exchange will occur world wide. In addition to fiber optics, dozens of other
technological innovations will end our dependency on the electromagnetic spectrum."
JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 308 (1991).
12 The right to be let alone by government officials, unless there exists sufficient
cause, is protected by the Fourth Amendment. This right is "perhaps the most personal
of all legal principles. It is also one of the newest, since only the more sophisticated of
societies have the interest and the ability to nurture that subtle and most personal
possession of man, his dignity." MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE
RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 1 (1962).
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enforcing criminal law.13 When technology comes into existence,
law enforcement often uses it first to engage in the "competitive
enterprise [to] ferret[ out crime."14 Further, the technology itself
may make it impossible to permit people who desire to keep
information private from achieving that goal. Among the reasons
that keeping matters private has become more difficult is that the
law simply cannot keep up with the rapid rise in communications
technology.15
The rise in technology is not a new issue;' 6 what is new is our
willingness to surrender control of how our personal information
13 See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
78 (2000) (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assoc. Att'y Gen. DOJ). "Carnivore
is '[e]ssentially a personal computer stuffed with specialized software, [which]
represents a new twist in the federal government's fight to sustain its snooping powers
in the Internet age.' The Wall Street Journal also reported that Carnivore 'can scan
millions of e-mails a second' . . . ." Trenton C. Haas, Carnivore and the Fourth
Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REV. 261, 261 (2001) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps to Scan E-mail Spark Concern,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3).
14 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
15 The ability of government to intrude electronically increases each day as
technology advances. Without statutory controls, it is likely that fewer areas of our
lives can be kept private. One insightful commentator has explained that:
[E]lectronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate. Interception of a
telephone line provides to law enforcement all of the target's
communications, whether they are relevant to the investigation or not,
raising concerns about compliance with the particularity requirement in the
Fourth Amendment and posing the risk of general searches. In addition,
electronic surveillance involves an on-going intrusion in a protected sphere,
unlike the traditional search warrant, which authorizes only one intrusion,
not a series of searches or a continuous surveillance. Officers must execute a
traditional search warrant with dispatch, not over a prolonged period of time.
If they do not find what they were looking for in a home or office, they must
leave promptly and obtain a separate order if they wish to return to search
again. Electronic surveillance, in contrast, continues around-the-clock for
days or months. Finally, the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on
lack of notice to the suspect.
James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH. 65, 70 (1997)
(footnotes omitted).
16 Professor Arthur Miller, in a prophetic statement about a quarter of a century
ago, framed the challenge of the courts' role in privacy protection and the challenges
that courts and society would face as we anticipated the promise of the high technology
age. He wrote:
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is stored and accessed in the face of our desire for the convenience
that communications technology offers. It is that topic on which
this Article focuses. This commentary is not intended to be an
extensive review of any aspect of the debate over privacy and
technology. Indeed, my purpose is to make thoughtful people ask
questions about how comfortable they have become with the mass
of easily accessible personal information stored by so many
entities.
These disputes about privacy, like all critical legal disputes
unaddressed by the legislature, will find their way to the nation's
courts. We can fully expect that the future will bring more
disputes into the judicial system as more technology is created,
impacting our private information and bringing new meaning to
the often-used expression that "Big Brother is watching."' 7 One
such dispute recently made its way to court in a somewhat
unusual way, emerging as a sentencing issue in a child sexual
abuse case, rather than a motion to suppress evidence alleged to
be illegally seized in a criminal prosecution.18 In the case of
The notion that the courts will recognize a general principle requiring data
handlers to treat personal information as confidential or will declare that file
keepers owe a fiduciary duty to file subjects seems to be wishful thinking.
Nor is it realistic to think that a pledge of confidentiality can be secured on a
contractual basis. In most situations involving data extraction, the individual
is in no position to demand a promise to this effect. Of course, the courts may
change their attitude when the potentialities of the computer become
apparent. But to wait for the courts to create common-law obligations and
impose them on information extractors, processors, transmitters, and users
for the benefit of data subjects will require the patience of Job and may prove
to be no more fruitful than agitating for the expansion of the common-law
privacy action. Time is a luxury personal privacy cannot afford and the
glacial movement of legal doctrine is inappropriate for the problem at hand.
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
DOSSIERS 220 (1971).
17 One insightful commentator has recognized that the "advent of widespread use
of computer technology .. . has altered the way in which individuals view the world ...
. Today, lawyers and business professionals must be cognizant of communications law,
criminal law, privacy law, and many other subjects that may not have been relevant to
their situation only a decade ago." RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES, LIABILITIES, III-1 (2d ed. 1992).
18 The so-called exclusionary rule has had its critics. Almost two decades after the
exclusionary rule had been adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), President
Ronald Reagan established a commission which recommended it be abolished. In its
report, the task force explained:
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United States v. Kramer, a federal appellate court was asked to
decide whether a telephone used in committing the crime at issue
was a "computer."19
I. THE KRAMER DECISION
In what can be fairly described as an opinion that centered on
only one definition that will no doubt affect many, a court was
asked to categorize a cellular telephone as a computer, as
described in certain federal criminal statutes. 20 The troubling
facts involved Neil Kramer's conviction of a crime against a
fifteen-year-old female from Missouri who inadvertently sent a
text message to Kramer's phone, beginning a seven-month period
of "text messaging and telephonic communication." 21 Kramer was
made aware of the victim's age.2 2 In November of 2008, Kramer
met the victim at a Missouri convenience store after driving from
his home in Louisiana. 23 "The pair drove to the Comfort Inn in
Willow Springs, Missouri, where he plied the victim with illegal
narcotics and then engaged in sexual intercourse with her."2 4 The
day after their first sexual encounter, the victim was transported
to Kramer's trailer located in Violet, Louisiana. On Friday 14,
2008, the victim was able to text her mother, reporting her
location from a Louisiana bar. 2 5 Members of the St. Bernard
Parish Sherriff's Department responded to the bar. 2 6 Kramer was
Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish the exclusionary rule
as it is applies to Fourth Amendment issues. . .. Anyone evaluating the
exclusionary rule must constantly keep this basic premise in mind. The
framers of the Constitution did not create the exclusionary rule for violations
of the Fourth Amendment. They could have done so. . . . The exclusionary
rule is instead a judicially created rule of procedure that fails to serve the
goals it seeks, and fails at a tremendous cost.
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME FINAL REPORT 24-25 (1982), available
at http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.html.
19 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011).
20 See Brief for the United States at 1, United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (8th
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1983).








subsequently arrested in the parking lot of the bar, and the victim
was reunited with her family.2 7
On December 21, 2009, Kramer pleaded guilty to the charge
of transportation of a minor with the intent to engage in criminal
sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). 28 Although
Kramer admitted to the unlawful behavior, his real dispute in the
courts focused on the consequences of his action: the length of his
incarceration. Under the federal statutes at issue, if it was found
that Kramer used a computer to commit his crimes, his sentence
could be substantially increased. The definition of "computer"
became a controversial focal point as the case moved through the
court system.
At his sentencing hearing, Kramer argued that the evidence
was inadequate to establish that his cell phone was, in fact, a
computer. 29 Among Kramer's arguments was that his phone did
not access the Internet.30 The government countered by arguing
that Kramer's cellular phone could act "as a calculator, [while
also] storing music, digital photographs, and video . . . ."31 The
district court judge agreed with the prosecutor's position,
concluding that Kramer's cellular phone was, in every important
respect, indistinguishable from a traditional computer.32 That
finding allowed a "two-level" enhancement of Kramer's
punishment under federal sentencing law.3 3 Kramer appealed his
conviction, which was affirmed on February 8, 2011, in an opinion
by Judge Wollman. 34
In reaching his decision, the judge quoted one of the modern
innovators of computers at the outset of his opinion. The judge
quoted Steve Wozniak, co-founder of Apple Computer, recently
commenting that "[e]verything has a computer in it nowadays."35
He posed the question at issue in the appeal of whether an
ordinary cellular phone-used only to place calls and send text
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3.
29 Id. at 6.
30 Id. at 12.
31 Id. at 10.
32 Id. at 6.
33 Id. at 7.
3 United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 900-01 (8th Cir. 2011).
3 Id. at 901.
902 [VOL. 81:5
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messages-constituted a computer.36 He observed that the district
court, relying on the definition of "computer" found in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(1), enhanced Neil Kramer's sentence for transporting a
minor in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in
criminal sexual activity with her, a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(a).37
Judge Wollman noted that at trial, defendant Kramer
"acknowledged that he used his cellular telephone-a Motorola
Motorazr V3-to make voice calls and send text messages to the
victim for a six-month period leading up to the offense."38 At the
earlier proceedings, the district court concluded that Kramer's
cellular phone was a "computer" pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(1).39 The district court then "applied a two-level
enhancement for its use to facilitate the offense, see U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3(b)(3) (2009), and sentenced
Kramer to 168 months' imprisonment." 40 Although the sentence
given by the judge was "within both the original and enhanced
guidelines ranges, the district court acknowledged that without
the enhancement it would have sentenced Kramer to 140 months'
imprisonment."41 The judge's statement about enhancement made
it clear that he was relying on the fact that the phone was a
computer for purposes of increasing Kramer's punishment.
Noting an objection to the judge's ruling, Kramer argued
"that application of the enhancement was procedural error
because a cellular telephone, when used only to make voice calls
and send text messages, cannot be a 'computer' as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)." 4 2 Kramer further complained that "even if a
phone could be a computer, the government's evidence was
insufficient to show that his phone met that definition."43 The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3(b)(3) provides a two-level
enhanced punishment for "the use of a computer . . . to . . .
36 Id. at 902.
37 Id. at 901.
38 Id. at 901-02.
39 See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2011).





persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the
minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. . . ."44
The broad definition of "computer" in criminal statute 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), 4 5 provides that any "electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
includes any data storage facility or communications facility ...
."46 might satisfy the statutory requirements to qualify as a
computer. It is clear, however, that "an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar
device" would not be included in the definition of a computer. 47
Kramer believed that "the district court incorrectly
interpreted the term 'computer' to include a 'basic cell phone"' that
he used only to call and send text messages to the victim. 4 8 The
circuit court rejected Kramer's view that the sentencing
"enhancement should apply only when a device is used to access
the Internet."49 Relying on the broad language of 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(1), the court held that "an electronic . . . or other high
speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or
storage functions," is a computer.50 The court noted that "[t]his
definition captures any device that makes use of a [sic] electronic
data processor, examples of which are legion."5 1
Kramer argued before the trial court that the word
"electronic" modifies "high speed data processing device"52 and
therefore the device must be both "electronic" and "high speed."5 3
The government countered that argument by asserting that
"electronic, magnetic, optical, [and] electrochemical" 54 data
processing devices are, by their nature, "high speed."55 Further,
4 Id.
4 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3(b)(3) cmt. at 205 n.1 (2009)
("'Computer' has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).").
46 Id.
4 Id.
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they argued that the language, "other high speed," was included
by Congress "to expand the statute to cover additional types of
high-speed devices that were not, or could not be, enumerated."56
After considering both arguments, the circuit court decided not to
resolve the disputed reading of the statute. It reasoned that "even
if Kramer's reading of the statute is correct, a modern cellular
phone can be a 'high speed' electronic device" and thus qualify a
defendant for an enhanced penalty.57 The circuit court further
explained: "Indeed, modern cellular phones process data at
comparable or faster rates than the desktop computers that
existed when § 1030(e)(1) was enacted."58
The court noted in dicta that a high speed electronic storage
device could potentially include "coffeemakers, microwave ovens,
watches, telephones, children's toys, MP3 players, refrigerators,
heating and air-conditioning units, radios, alarm clocks,
televisions, and DVD players, in addition to more traditional
computers like laptops or desktop computers."59
It further explained that "each time an electronic processor
performs any task-from powering on, to receiving keypad input,
to displaying information-it performs logical, arithmetic, or
storage functions. These functions are the essence of its
operation."60
The circuit court also concluded that there was "nothing in
the statutory definition that purports to exclude devices because
they lack a connection to the Internet."i6 Although the court
acknowledged that the term computer "does not include an
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held
calculator, or other similar device,"62 it did not think Congress
intended to exclude all non-Internet-enabled devices from the
definition of "computer."63
56 Id.
57 Id. at 903 n.3.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 903 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577 (2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).






Although the circuit court acknowledged that a "basic"
cellular phone might not easily fit within the colloquial definition
of "computer,"64 the court asserted it was bound "not by the
common understanding of that word, but by the specific-if
broad-definition set forth in § 1030(e)(1)." 6 5 The court
surprisingly acknowledged that "it may be that neither the
Sentencing Commission nor Congress anticipated that a cellular
phone would be included in that definition." 66
At the district court hearing, "[tihe government did not,
however, offer any expert testimony regarding the phone's
capabilities."6 7 ' The circuit court noted that "the materials
presented to the district court were sufficient to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that Kramer's phone was an
'electronic . . . or other high speed data processing device' that
'perform[ed] logical, arithmetic, or storage functions' when it was
used by Kramer to call and text message the victim." 6 8
From the phone's user's manual presented to the trial court
by the prosecution, "the phone is powered by a '680 mAh Li-ion'
battery, has '5MB' of memory, is capable of running software,
makes use of a 'Graphic Accelerator' to run its color display
screens, has a 'User-customizable' main menu, and comes with
'Preloaded' text messages."69
The user's manual "warns that the phone may include
copyrighted Motorola and third-party software stored in
semiconductor memories or other media."70 Thus, these features
"are sufficient to show that the phone makes use of an electronic
data processor . . . [and] performs arithmetic, logical, and storage
functions when the phone is used to place a call. The user's
manual notes that the phone 'keeps lists of incoming and outgoing
calls, even for calls that did not connect."'71 Furthermore, cell
phones tracked "the elapsed time from the moment [the user]
64 Id.
65 United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2011).
66 Id.
6 Id. at 904.
68 Id.
69 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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connect[s] to [the] service provider's network to the moment [the
user] end[s] the call by pressing [the end key]."7 2 The phone's
counting function was a key element supporting the circuit court's
finding that the phone met the requirements of the statute.73
These capabilities all supported the district court's conclusion that
the phone performed arithmetic, logical, and storage functions
when Kramer used it to send text messages to the victim. 7
II. WHY IS THE KRAMER DECISION IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE?
A simple judicial decision defining a basic term in a statute
should not raise an eyebrow given that courts perform such a
function daily. The Kramer decision seems to fit the mold of an
ordinary opinion at first glance. Upon closer examination, the case
sends a subtle message of legislative responsibility for the
language that it creates. The opinion curiously begins by citing
one of the icons of the high technology age, one of Apple
Computer's founders.75 By starting the opinion with this
acknowledgment of innovation in communications technology, one
might suspect the movement of technology would play a
prominent role in the opinion. Yet this was not the case. The judge
paid only minor lip service to the technological ramifications of
defining nearly every modern cell phone as a computer for the
purpose of federal sentencing enhancement.
Using a dictionary definition approach 76 to decide the case,
the court mentioned little of the long-term importance of its
opinion on future criminal investigations or other matters
involving emerging technology. If the clear outcome of Kramer
dictates the use of simple statutory construction in defining
"computer," then perhaps the question is settled.77 Privacy
72 Id.
73 Id. at 905.
7 Id.
75 United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 2011).
76 See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 277 (2d ed. 2005) (defining "central
processing unit" as "the part of a computer in which operations are controlled and
executed").
77 Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577 (2010) ("Just think of the common household items that




advocates may feel there is no need for alarm. Indeed, law
enforcement is no doubt content with the outcome that a
defendant like Neil Kramer can be punished more severely
because he used a "computer" to commit his crime. The police,
after all, can be expected to use the full arsenal of weapons at
their disposal to detect and prove criminal activity.78 After all,
Kramer committed what many feel is the most serious crime of
all-a sexual offense against a minor.79 Surely Congress could not
be faulted for trying to achieve the goal of severely punishing such
offenders. Assuming Congress intended such a broad definition of
a computer as the court in Kramer suggests, what does Kramer's
holding mean for other courts facing similar questions involving
emerging technologies?
Think about the type of evolving technologies that routinely
seize and store all kinds of information that some may consider
private. Every time a vehicle goes through a toll booth the tag is
recorded and linked to whatever sensitive information is attached
to that registered vehicle's owner.80 Similarly, speed and red light
photo cameras record images81 of a driver and his or her
78 Thomas K. Clancy, noted this flexibility in law enforcement:
Crime has changed, as have the means of law enforcement, and it would
therefore be naive to assume that those actions a constable could take in an
English or American village three centuries ago should necessarily govern
what we, as a society, now regard as proper. Thus, the Court has sometimes
asserted that the Amendment's "prohibition against 'unreasonable searches
and seizures' must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and
conditions."'
Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an 'Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129, 184 (2003) (footnote omitted) (quoting Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 Law enforcement obviously needs data in order to investigate and prosecute
crime. High technology has proven particularly useful in the prosecution of offenders
engaged in child pornography. See Jason Krause, Can Anyone Stop Internet Porn?:
Courts Have Shot Down Laws Protecting Kids from Obscenity Online. Is Cyberspace
Suited for a Virtual Privacy Wrapper?, 88 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 56.
so Public use of intrusive video technology is growing. See M.J. Zuckerman,
Chances Are, Somebody's Watching You, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2000, at 01.A (describing
a forty million dollar surveillance center using 110 remote control cameras in the
suburbs of Washington).
81 New forms of surveillance technology that actually record facial images and
compare features to other persons located in computer databases have been
increasingly used by law enforcement. See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial
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passengers while noting the time of travel. 82 Gasoline purchase
records document how much fuel is in a vehicle and the location of
purchase with startling accuracy.
When a customer shops for groceries, the store records the
customer's purchases to identify preferences. These records of
tastes and prior choices are recorded to allow the merchant to
offer a coupon to purchase your favorite tissue paper days before it
runs out. Cellular phones are capable of locating individuals
almost anywhere in the world with startling accuracy. All of these
intrusions are given little thought because of the conveniences the
technology brings to our lives. Instant coupons, weekly special
values, discounts for future purchases, and other inducements
make us surrender our e-mail addresses to take advantage of
these benefits. In short, citizens love the ease and comfort these
technologies afford.
Law enforcement has benefited greatly from the accuracy of
record keeping that the computer era has provided. Little thought
is given to where this information "lives" or is stored when it is
waiting to be reviewed or retrieved.83 It is usually unclear who
Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295,
303-08 (1999) (describing digital and biometrics technology).
82 Consider, as an example of intrusion, the use of red light cameras, which has
emerged over the last decade. Currently, the surveillance method is so common that we
are no longer surprised by the mailed notices, capturing our vehicle and often a
passenger, the time of violation, and our exact location at a camera-equipped
intersection. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). One federal
court had this comment about the law:
The passage of the Patriot Act altered and to some degree muddied the
landscape. In October 2001, Congress amended FISA [Foreign Surveillance
Intelligence Act] to change "the purpose" language . . . . It also added a
provision allowing "Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to
acquire foreign intelligence information" to "consult with Federal law
enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against"
attack or other grave hostile acts, sabotage or international terrorism, or
clandestine intelligence activities, by foreign powers or their agents.
In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 728-29 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
83 If there is any doubt that the government continues to construe Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), with any less than the broadest possible scope, the
testimony of Deputy Associate Attorney General Kevin DiGregory during a
congressional hearing on government surveillance issues is instructive. DiGregory said:
[The Supreme Court held, in Maryland versus Smith [sic], I believe, in 1979,
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed by a
telephone, because essentially, when someone turns over information to a
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has permission to review this information. These concerns have
raised little alarm so long as a better "smart phone" is on the way
soon.84
One might suggest that in many of the concerns I raise the
user of the technology knowingly and willingly exposes their
information to third parties-in the cases of seized photographic
images, they may not be considered private at all.85 Furthermore,
since much of the information that I have complained about is not
seized by government officials, it is not private at all or even
subject to Fourth Amendment review. Even when the Fourth
Amendment is implicated, courts sometimes struggle with where
the line of protection should be drawn when new technologies are
involved.86 Thus, we may have surrendered our personal
third party, like the telephone company, they should not have either a
subjective or an objective reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information.
Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000)
(emphasis added) (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assoc. Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
84 All eyes have been trained on News Corp. in recent weeks, following allegations
that the now-defunct News of the World hacked the phones of more than 4000
politicians, crime victims, and celebrities:
[Tihe art of getting people to inadvertently divulge information through
seemingly innocuous questions-is one way, and it's as simple as going on a
website and tricking a system or individual. For example, Christopher
Soghoian, a fellow at the Center for Applied Cypersecurity [sic] Research, in a
quick email shared a website called phonegangster.com. The website can
send visitors directly to a voicemail account, where they can insert a pass
code by spoofing a phone number.
Lyneka Litle, Murdoch Scandal Fallout- Consumers Make Cell Phone Hacking Eay, ABC NEWS (July
22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/murdoch-scandal-fallout-consumers-make-
cell-phone-hacking/story?id=14128470&singlePage=true.
85 The storing of visual images, in general, raises many concerns in society. "Video-
surveillance cameras quietly scan many workplaces. Neighborhood retailers now stock
hardware that used to be the stuff of spy novels." Richard Lacayo, Tom Curry, Thomas
McCarrol & Dennis Wyss, Assaulting Our Privacy: Nowhere to Hide, TIME, Nov. 11,
1991, at 34.
86 Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51-52 (2002) ("Advances in science
and technology recurrently exert pressure on the scope and meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, but the privacy and security protected by the Fourth Amendment should
not depend on innovations and technology. . . . During the Framers' era, the home was
the focal point of privacy and personal security." (footnote omitted)). "When the
American Republic was founded, the framers established a libertarian equilibrium
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information without much thought as to who might retrieve it or if
we can limit its use. We have simply allowed it to be sent to the
winds, incapable of ever controlling it again.87 With the exception
of some medical88 and financial data,89 very little statutory
protection is provided for much of the information routinely
communicated over our "computer phones." Has this truly been a
willing choice, or have we simply been enchanted by the science of
communication?90 Perhaps it does not matter anymore. The
average citizen has lost so much control over their personal
information that it may be impossible to reverse the trend.9'
Perhaps the benefits of technology are so great we simply do not
care about how our privacy has been diminished.92 Perhaps the
among the competing values of privacy, disclosure and surveillance." ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 67 (1967).
8 One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that "[i]n this era of rapid technological
change, the freedom to be unnoticed in public, and its associated benefits, will
disappear unless a right to public anonymity is recognized and enforced." Christopher
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to
Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 217, 314-15 (2002) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
should be construed to recognize a right to public anonymity as a part of privacy
expectations because "government surveillance of our innocent public activities that
are not meant for public consumption is neither expected nor to be condoned").
98 Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave
Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 933-34 (2002). The
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a New York central computer databank
containing the names and addresses of all persons obtaining drugs by prescription.
9 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (citing United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
financial information contained at the defendant's bank because a "depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the [g]overnment"); FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 7 (1980).
90 See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 Miss. L.J. 317, 425 n.386 (2002) ("As society
has evolved and our lives have become more mobile, as we spend more and more of our
waking hours away from home, there may be even more reason to prize our right to
preserve secrecy outside dwellings and to be concerned with novel perils generated by
scientific and technological progress.").
91 "Repeated invasions by credit bureaus, employers, and the like can lead persons
to discount most expectations as unreasonable; individual fears of a loss of privacy then
become self-fulfilling prophecies. In particular, the government can through its actions
redefine popular expectations so as to undermine constitutional rights." Comment,
Legitimate Expectations of Privacy Against Unreasonable Searches and the 'Automatic
Standing Rule,"94 HARV. L. REV. 196, 203 (1980).
92 The value of personal privacy has been a concept that many thinkers have
pondered for well over a century. One particularly longstanding comment of privacy
reminds us that "[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
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Kramer court's casual approach to controlling emerging
technology reflects our casual attitude toward the protection of
privacy.93
CONCLUSION
Maybe there is no Big Brother 94 to worry about after all, only
Little Brother! If we like that law enforcement is having an easier
time prosecuting crime because of the computer, there is no need
to be alarmed. If we want our local grocer to remind us we are
running out of coffee, we are happy for them to evaluate our
kitchen closet.95 If we want our computer to remember the web
site we visited a week ago to get a recipe, perhaps we do not mind
if our internet service provider sells our information to a cooking
school. 96 In an age when fear of terrorism dominates both the need
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.
. . . [T]he right to be let alone . . . has grown to comprise every form of possession-
intangible, as well as tangible." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1891).
9 The challenge for the Kramer court was to take seriously the very real threat
posed to societal privacy by what appears to many to be a routine case. Such decisions
also pose a danger of courts being too casual with their role as protector of individual
liberty. One insightful commentator has noted that "technological advances pose the
challenges that always beset the constitutional enterprise-those involved with trying
to create fixed rules, or at least a workable rule of law, for a changing world." Susan
Bandes, Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1379, 1383 (2002).
94 M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 227-28 (1995) ("In Orwell's society,
there was no right of privacy or expectation of privacy. In our society, privacy is highly
valued and some legal rights of privacy do exist. Yet privacy, in the sense of being able
to control information about oneself, is also an eroding condition." (footnote omitted)).
9- Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) ("We are not unaware of the threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files. . . . The right to collect
and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.").
96 An important aspect of electronic searches is their potential scope. They are not
merely limited to information or historical facts, but also permit access to discovering
future events. As one commentator explained:
The conventional search is limited to a designated thing in being-one of a
finite number of things to be found in the place where the search is to be
conducted, and ordinarily discoverable in a single brief visit. On the other
hand, electronic surveillance is a quest for something which may happen in
the future. Its effectiveness normally depends upon a protracted period of
lying-in-wait. For however long that may be, the lives and thoughts of many
people-not merely the immediate target but all who chance to wander into
the web-are exposed to an unknown and undiscriminating intruder. Such a
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and the use of intrusive technology,97 we are likely to discount the
very protections envisioned by our Founding Fathers in the Bill of
Rights. Again, we are often reminded that the desire to be secure
should always dominate our need to choose more privacy when
intrusion becomes both quick and easy.
Perhaps George Orwell was correct about the final outcome of
all this technology when he said, "Forty years it had taken him to
learn .... 0 cruel, needless misunderstanding! ... But it was all
right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had
won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother."98 Perhaps we
search has no channel and is certain to be far more pervasive and intrusive
than a properly conducted search for a specific, tangible object at a defined
location.
Ralph S. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 189 (1969).
9 David Hardin, Note, The Fuss over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of
the USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 291, 345 (2003) ("Although the conflicting interests involved are
compelling, the paramount function of national security is to vigilantly protect the
ideals embodied by the very same Amendment that the standard violates. Those ideals
cannot be whittled away in today's desire to defend the very same values that provide
for our security.").
98 ORWELL, supra note 2. In a recent Supreme Court oral argument regarding
whether it was constitutional for the government to track anyone it choose by
attaching a Global Positioning Satellite device on their vehicle (GPS), the following
exchange occurred between the government attorney and Chief Justice John Roberts,
reflecting the potential consequences of the government's willingness to use technology
in law enforcement:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a search if
you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our movements for a
month? You think you're entitled to do that under your theory?
MR. DREEBEN: The justices of this Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. (Laughter.)
MR. DREEBEN: Under our theory and under this Court's cases, the justices
of this Court when driving on public roadways have no greater expectation
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So your answer is yes, you could tomorrow
decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our cars, follow us for a
month; no problem under the Constitution?
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should think about what we are giving up and not be so quick to
fall in love.99
MR. DREEBEN: Well, equally, Mr. Chief Justice, if the FBI wanted to it
could put its team of surveillance agents around the clock on any individual
and follow that individual's movements as they went around on the public
streets and they would thereby gather ....
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No.
10-1259).
9 It has been argued that a "good society must have its hiding places-its
protected crannies for the soul. Under the pitiless eye of safety the soul will wither."
Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1172
(1965).
